FOREIGN POLICY: Was Iraq better off under Saddam Hussein than it is today?
Baha Al-Araji: The Iraqi people knew terrible oppression and prejudice from the dictator Saddam Hussein, and the Iraqi people once thought that the American project would end that. But because the American commanders lack any awareness of the nature of the Iraqi people, their presence has actually increased the level of oppression.
Saddam Hussein killed my father and my elder brother and jailed one of my brothers and my mother for a long time. Some of my family escaped Iraq and lived in exile, while others remained in the country. Now we are able to see, unfortunately, that the situation during Saddam’s reign was better than today because then, the oppression was targeted and predictable. Today, danger and oppression overwhelm all Iraqi people without exception.
FP: Why are the Americans failing in Iraq?
BAA: The situation in Iraq differs from that in the United States. There is bureaucratic competition for power [in the United States]. The Department of Defense took control for a certain period, and then the State Department did. And this kind of alternating power and influence is good. But that is the United States. The same is not true in Iraq. Thus, the American project in Iraq will fail.
Sometimes, the Iraqi government reaches a good agreement with the political advisor of the U.S. embassy here in Baghdad. But, then, suddenly, in the night, some military commander will [attack] a certain local community. And so negates the accord that was reached between the Iraqi government and the U.S. embassy’s political advisor.
The Americans should look at the Iraqis as Iraqis, not [as] Americans in training.
FP: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki wants to disband the militias or find some way to incorporate them into the government. What does this mean for Sadr’s movement and the Mahdi Army?
BAA: I personally disagree with [that]. Whether or not these militias undermine the sovereignty of the Iraqi government is an open question. This question was provoked by the Maliki government. [They] raised it for purely political reasons in an effort to provoke a clash between the Sadr movement and the current government.
The emergence of militias in Iraq is a natural response to the situation here. There is a principle which says that for every action, there is a reaction. So, when there are occupation forces on the ground, there should naturally be a resistance to that occupation. We choose peaceful and diplomatic resistance, so the government and the coalition forces should not exaggerate our activities. Because those of us who are affiliated with the Sadr movement are sensitive, we don’t like to provoke this contentious question.
Do you know that 60 percent of the Mahdi Army already serves in government programs and installations? One of our biggest challenges with this issue is getting the Americans to understand it. The problem is that the U.S. leaders in Iraq, even though they are here, still think in an American way. But Iraq totally differs in its nature, its economy, and its culture from the United States.
FP: Many people in the American government blame the Mahdi Army for some of the insecurity. How do you respond to these critics?
BAA: There are many terrorists who can acquire and get this green badge [pointing to his Green Zone credential]. Terrorists can easily gain access to the Green Zone. And they enter with weapons. This highly protected area is already penetrated. Some of these activities have been disclosed by the Iraqi government and the Americans as the actions of the Mahdi Army. But these actions are actually not linked to [us], because our army is ideological.
FP: In the elections in December 2005, the Sadr movement was part of the United Iraqi Alliance. But now you’re saying that you’re anti-government. What are the relations like between the parties in the UIA?
BAA: Because I am affiliated with the Sadr movement, I received 40,000 votes. If I had run as an individual candidate, I would only have received 3,000 votes.... But 70 percent of these attacks, and this is my personal viewpoint, derive from disputes between the leadership of the political parties, whether they are in the council of representatives or the government. This is unacceptable.
FP: What should be the role of Iraq’s neighbors?
BAA: We have problems, unfortunately, with all of Iraq’s neighbors. Some are historical problems. Some are ethnic problems … The Shiites are the majority in Iraq. But, in the Islamic world, they are the minority. And our neighbors, the Arab countries that border us, are 100 percent Sunni. So they fear the situation in Iraq. To be sure, some of the problems we face today in Iraq are of our own making. But the biggest challenges derive from Iraq’s neighbors. Our mistake is that we didn’t go to them in the beginning and tell them about the nature of Shiites in Iraq, that we are peaceful. But the real problem—the enduring challenge—is that Iraq’s neighbors won’t tolerate a Shiite-governed Iraq. They think that there is major collaboration between Iraqi Shia and Iran, but we will control this. It is a very big mistake to think that our community works at the behest of Iranian allies and friends.
I don’t think Iran likes Iraq. Iran is the beneficiary of this current situation. Iran’s enemy is the United States, so Iran does everything in its power to fuel instability in the new Iraq so that Iran can remain strong and keep the United States distracted. The reason nobody is doing anything about Iran’s nuclear program is that they are all too busy trying to salvage Iraq.
We also have a small problem with Syria. Saddam’s regime was affiliated with the same school and political party that rules Syria. In Syria, there are many in the local Baath Party leadership who think that the situation in Iraq is a big loss for the Baath Party. Though the Syrian Baathist ideology differs from Saddam’s, there is still a desire [there] to see him reinstated. And this sense of party solidarity has led them to incite instability in Iraq in order to ensure that the occupiers—and the new government they support—fail.
FP: Do you think Kurdistan will split off from Iraq? Will the south also secede?
BAA: Of course other regions want to secede. Would you want to be part of this mess by choice? If you believed that you could build a prosperous life and leave the forces of violence to fight their own petty wars of attrition on the streets of Baghdad, you would do it. These threats of secession say nothing of Iraqi unity or fragmentation. People just want a normal life.
This interview is excerpted from an upcoming volume of the Oxford International Review.
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