Geopolitical Diary: A Nuclear Umbrella in the Middle East?

July 22, 2009 | 2207 GMT

On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton raised the prospect of an American “defense umbrella” for allies in the Middle East if Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons. Clinton was quick to add that this option does not represent any change in official U.S. policy (which is still to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear bomb in the first place) and was careful to keep the N word (“nuclear”) well away from the word “umbrella.”

In many policymaking circles, the underlying discussion about the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions is beginning to shift, from preventing a nuclear-armed Iran from emerging to dealing with the reality of an Iran with nuclear weapons. While the White House has not made a decision in this regard, there are two principal methods the United States uses to contain adversaries: the nuclear umbrella and the military alliance.

First, the nuclear umbrella option. In lieu of permitting allies to develop their own nuclear weapons (indeed, at times in order to dissuade them from doing so), the United States occasionally provides assurances that its strategic deterrent extends to them as well. Currently, this umbrella covers not only NATO states, but also Japan, South Korea and Australia. This has the benefit of keeping such weapons in fewer hands — and mostly in Washington’s — and preventing a nuclear arms race in various regions. In addition, by providing the “covered” state with an important defensive capability, Washington gains greater leverage over its decisions in terms of national defense.

Second, there is the military alliance option. Interrelated with the nuclear umbrella, this option is the commitment that has been the foundation of the NATO alliance for more than 60 years. At the heart of the commitment is the Article 5 protection that makes an attack on one equivalent to an attack on all. Obviously, this is entailed in the nuclear umbrella scenario, as U.S. nuclear weapons could be used in reprisal for a nuclear attack. But the Article 5 guarantee extends beyond the nuclear realm, to include any armed attack. Arrangements like Article 5 represent the highest level of commitment to a military alliance.

The United States need not make such a major and overt commitment to allies in the Middle East or other regions. There are many intermediate steps in military training and support through which Washington could attempt to strengthen allies’ individual and collective military capabilities. This cooperation also could benefit Washington: The greater the role the United States takes in building up and sustaining an ally’s military force, as well as the more prominent and overt the U.S. military’s role in defensive scenarios and war plans, the greater the American influence will be in its allies’ individual and collective defense. That influence can translate into significant U.S. input in the structure, posture and disposition within an alliance. This can include orienting regional militaries to less critical, but manpower- or resource-intensive mission areas, while allowing Washington to focus on maintaining capabilities it considers more suited to its own interests and capabilities. This also ensures that Washington maintains control over strategic or decisive capabilities.

For example, Washington spent less time during the Cold War fretting about an attack by Pyongyang than it did worrying about Seoul instigating another war on the Korean Peninsula — thereby implicating Washington in a war it did not want. Consequently, the United States used its decisive role in supporting South Korea to shape Seoul’s military capability — ensuring that it did not have the capability to start a war without direct, planned U.S. support.

Obviously, exactly what Clinton meant by “defensive umbrella” in her remarks on Wednesday was deliberately obscure, and there is no indication yet of a shift in U.S. policy in the Middle East. Exactly what some sort of increased military cooperation with the Gulf states — or even an alliance arrangement — might look like remains unclear.

But there is no love lost between the Arabs of the Gulf states and the Persians of Iran, and this fact presents a potential foundation for a containment strategy against Iran. Such a strategy could alter the regional dynamic for Iran, perhaps significantly. In terms of economic livelihood, Tehran has only one coast (though there is some Caspian trade, it is insufficient to sustain Iran) — and the United States is the decisive naval power in the Persian Gulf. There are scenarios in which further unification of U.S. and Gulf state military efforts would allow a noose to be tightened around Tehran. In the 20th century, a highly committed bloc in Europe, NATO, ultimately contributed to bringing down the Soviet Union by presenting a unified front. Iran is no Soviet Union, so an alliance could be both less unified than NATO and at the same time more debilitating for Iran than it was for the Soviet Union.

But is Iran worth the price? A serious alliance arrangement would require a long-term American commitment, at a time when Washington is looking to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan. The trajectory of American defense strategy points toward increased agility and flexibility. Tying itself down in new defensive arrangements — particularly a potentially onerous alliance in a perennially unstable corner of the world — would be the opposite of that. The more committed the United States is to the arrangement or alliance, the more difficult it is to back out — and backing out would do significant, perhaps irreversible, damage to America’s credibility with its other allies.

The ultimate problem is the need to continually demonstrate the ongoing U.S. commitment to its allies. The Korean and Vietnam wars were partly about demonstrating American resolve to its allies in Europe, to give a sense of the scale of the potential commitment. With two wars already under way and a resurgent Russia to contain, another major commitment would not be particularly enticing to Washington, no matter how effective it would be against Iran — that is, unless the risk from Iran is deemed serious enough to demand it.

Geopolitical Diary: The Making of a Taliban Emirate in Pakistan

The legislative and executive branches of the Pakistani government on Monday approved a Feb. 17 peace agreement between the provincial government in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and a Taliban rebel group based in NWFP’s Swat district. The agreement allows for the enforcement of a legal system based on “Islamic” law in the greater Swat region, in exchange for an end to the Taliban insurgency. Arguing that legal systems will vary from area to area in keeping the local culture, the supporters of the move — both within the government and society — say that the agreement will lead to the end of violence. Given the jihadist agenda, it is unlikely that this will happen; rather, the state’s capitulation will only embolden the jihadists to pursue their goals with greater vigor.

Lacking any strategy to combat the spreading insurgency, the Pakistani state over the past couple of years has lost more and more ground to Pashtun jihadists in its northwest. But until now, there has been only a de facto evaporation of the writ of the state – a situation Islamabad viewed as temporary. The approval of the Sharia deal by an overwhelming majority in Parliament, however, and the president’s signature on the peace agreement represent an acknowledgment of defeat on the part of the state — a situation that is very difficult to reverse, especially for a country that is grappling with all sorts of domestic and international issues.

Allowing a special political and legal dispensation in a given part of its territory essentially amounts to recognizing the autonomy of the region in question. It should be noted that the Pakistani state has, since its inception, fiercely resisted the minority provinces’ demands for autonomy.

The recognition of what amounts to a Taliban emirate in a significant portion of the NWFP comes at a time when Balochistan, the large province in southwest Pakistan, is experiencing a fresh wave of violence — triggered by last week’s killing of three key separatist leaders, allegedly by the country’s security apparatus. Not only will legislating a Taliban-style legal system for the greater Swat region facilitate the Talibanization of significant parts of the country, it also will embolden Baloch separatism. In other words, the two provinces that border Afghanistan could spin out of control. An accelerating meltdown of Islamabad’s writ in its western periphery seriously undermines the Obama administration’s regional strategy concerning the Taliban and transnational jihadism.

Insurgencies in the Pashtun and Baloch areas threaten Western military supply routes running through the two provinces and make it increasingly difficult for U.S. and NATO forces to level the battlefield in Afghanistan. The situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border is becoming even more fluid, allowing Taliban insurgents on both sides to make gains in their respective theaters. Such a scenario has a direct bearing on the political component of the U.S. strategy, as it makes negotiations with pragmatic Taliban elements all the more elusive.

In fact, the negotiations between the Taliban in Pakistan’s Swat region and Islamabad set a bad precedent, undermining any U.S. efforts to reach out to pragmatic Taliban in Afghanistan. Seeing the success of their counterparts in Swat, the Afghan Taliban are likely to insist that they will negotiate with their fellow Afghans only after Western forces leave the country. This means that Western forces are looking at a long conflict — one in which the jihadists, and not the United States and NATO, will have the advantage called Pakistan.